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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The 2008-09 economic crisis has led to an unprecedented erosion of fiscal positions in 
both advanced and emerging market economies. The average fiscal deficit in advanced 
economies rose from 1.1 percent of GDP in 2007 to 9 percent in 2009, while the increase was 
smaller but still sizable in emerging market economies, from a surplus of 1.3 percent to a 
deficit of 4.6 percent. Although budget deficits narrowed by 2012, fiscal vulnerabilities 
remain elevated, especially in advanced economies with gross public debt levels of 110 
percent of GDP, on average, up from 74 percent in 2007. Furthermore, fiscal policy has 
become more volatile, with the standard deviation of the overall budget balance rising from 
an average of 0.9 between 2000 and 2007 to 1.7 after the crisis in advanced economies and 
from 1.0 to 1.2 in emerging markets, partly reflecting more volatile environment. Although 
these unusual developments have generally been blamed on fiscal stimulus packages, the 
severity of the economic downturn, and the bailout of financial institutions, the extent of the 
change in fiscal positions and the variation in policy responses call for an in-depth analysis of 
the underlying determinants of discretionary fiscal policy and its volatility over time. 
 
An extensive literature on fiscal reaction functions links fiscal behavior to a host of 
macro-financial and institutional characteristics. Most empirical studies find that the 
fiscal policy stance tends to be procyclical, although theoretical considerations require 
neutral or countercyclical behavior. The literature has identified a link between cross-country 
divergence in discretionary fiscal policy and a wide range of macro-financial and 
demographic characteristics and institutional and political features. There is also empirical 
evidence suggesting that fiscal rules and external anchors, such as an International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)-supported economic stabilization programs, tend to influence fiscal behavior. 
Even though empirical findings are broadly consistent, most of the literature focus on 
advanced economies and cover the period prior to the 2008-09 economic crisis. These studies 
also tend to rely on unbalanced panels and do not deal with econometric complications 
associated with endogenous regressors and country-specific heterogeneity. 
 
This paper empirically investigates the main determinants of discretionary fiscal policy 
and its volatility in advanced and emerging market economies. First, differently from 
previous studies, this paper estimates fiscal reaction functions for a large panel of advanced 
and emerging market economies, using the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a 
measure of discretionary fiscal policy and focusing on possible differences between the two 
groups of countries.
1 Second, this paper studies a wide range of economic, financial, 
demographic and institutional variables as potential determinants over two decades including 
                                                 
1 Although there are some caveats in estimation, the cyclically adjusted primary balance helps minimize the 
simultaneity bias that may arise as policy decisions and growth interact. For a criticism of the cyclically 
adjusted primary budget balance as an approximation of discretionary fiscal policy, see Mélitz (2000), Alberola, 
Mínguez, De Cos, and Marqués (2003), Larch and Salto (2005), and Riera-Crichton, Végh, and Vuletin (2012).   4
the aftermath of the 2008-09 crisis. Third, as the crisis has shown, macroeconomic volatility 
can have larger impact than previously expected, and therefore this paper estimates the 
determinants of time-varying volatility of discretionary fiscal policy, as measured by the 
standard deviation of the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Fourth, we adopt a dynamic 
panel estimation approach based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that 
corrects for biases associated with endogenous regressors and unobserved country-specific 
heterogeneity. Finally, this paper relies on a balanced panel that yields more robust 
estimations than unbalanced panels widely used in the literature.
2 
 
The empirical results suggest that discretionary fiscal policy is influenced by a range of 
macro-financial and institutional factors. In line with the literature, the results show that 
discretionary fiscal policy exhibits a high degree of inertia and responds to the level of public 
debt and the output gap in both advanced and emerging market economies. In addition, we 
find that macro-financial factors—such as real exchange rate, financial development, interest 
rates, asset prices, and natural resource rents—and demographic and institutional factors—
such as the old-age dependency ratio, the quality of institutions, and policy anchors such as 
fiscal rules and IMF-supported stabilization programs—tend to have a significant influence 
fiscal behavior. The results indicate that these factors tend to influence discretionary fiscal 
policy differently in advanced and emerging market economies and that policy inertia is 
significantly greater in the post-crisis period. We also find strong evidence that fiscal policy 
behavior after the recent crisis has turned even more procyclical and become less responsive 
to the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and, therefore, long-run fiscal solvency 
concerns. Finally, we show that higher government debt leads to more volatile policy 
behavior, while fiscal rules and higher institutional quality reduce fiscal volatility. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview 
of the literature, followed by a summary of panel data sources in Section III. Sections IV and 
V describe our empirical strategy and the estimation results, respectively. Robustness checks 
are presented in Section VI, while Sections VII offers some concluding remarks. 
 
II.   THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
Fiscal policy tends to be procyclical, as opposed to theoretical considerations calling for 
neutral or countercyclical behavior. The tax-smoothing model with perfect foresight 
proposed by Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) argues that fiscal policy is 
determined by the government’s need to smooth distortions associated with taxation. 
Accordingly, revenue and spending shocks should be absorbed by budget deficits during 
economic recessions and by surpluses in times of economic expansion. From an empirical 
                                                 
2 Balanced panels provide equal heterogeneity conditional distribution, avoid the initial value problem with 
observations entering at the same time points, and produce consistent estimates.    5
point of view, however, the tax-smoothing theory cannot explain the persistence of budget 
deficits, and why countries facing similar economic shocks experience in reality different 
fiscal policy paths. Many empirical studies find that the fiscal policy stance tends to be 
procyclical, contrary to theoretical considerations that call for neutral or countercyclical 
behavior.
3 However, most the existing literature does not use a cyclically-adjusted measure of 
the fiscal policy stance and tend to rely on unbalanced panels with a focus on some variables 
of particular interest.   
 
The empirical literature has identified a link between cross-country divergence in fiscal 
behavior and a range of macro-financial and demographic characteristics. Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) found evidence that the budget balance is mainly correlated with economic 
growth, as well as with the level of per capita income, leading to diverging fiscal trends 
between countries at different stages of development. Several studies have focused on the 
impact of interest rates in modeling fiscal policy behavior (Baldacci et al., 2011 and Kiley, 
2012), while others have identified trade openness, financial development and natural 
resource rents as important factors in determining fiscal policy behavior (Alesina and Perotti, 
1995). The fiscal consequences of financial crises are also considered to have a significant 
effect on discretionary policy decisions (Schaechter et al, 2012). Demographic characteristics 
also appear to influence fiscal policy behavior (Woo, 2003, 2009). 
 
Political institutions appear to play a role in determining the extent and persistence of 
fiscal imbalances. Building on the theory of political business cycles, Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) showed that government fragmentation tends to result in large and persistent budget 
deficits and excessive fiscal policy reactions in response to economic shocks. Other empirical 
studies have confirmed this relationship between fiscal performance and a wide range of 
institutional and political factors, including budget institutions and procedures, type of 
political regime, government structure, ideological orientation, electoral cycles, the quality of 
institutions, and corruption, among others, in samples of advanced and developing countries.
4 
Some papers also find that fiscal rules and external anchors, such as an IMF-supported 
program, tend to have a positive effect on fiscal policy behavior (see, for example, Celasun, 
Debrun, and Ostry, 2006; Debrun et al., 2008; Poplawski-Ribeiro, 2009; Ghosh et al., 2013).  
 
An important aspect of fiscal policy behavior is its time-varying volatility, which may 
have significant macro-financial implications. Although it has received less attention in the 
literature, excessive volatility in fiscal policy can undermine fiscal sustainability and lead to 
macro-financial distortions. Ramey and Ramey (1995) presented evidence that government 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Bohn, 1998; Talvi and Végh, 2000; Favero, 2002; Galí and Perotti, 
2003; Lane, 2003; Balassone and Francese, 2004; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004; Alesina and Tabellini, 
2005; Annett, 2006; Wyplosz, 2006; Debrun and Kumar, 2007; Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh, 2010. 
4 Eslava (2011) provides a recent overview of the literature on the political economy of fiscal policy.   6
spending volatility has a negative effect on real GDP per capita growth. Looking at the 
underlying determinants, Furceri and Poplawski-Riberio (2008) found that smaller countries 
tend to have more volatile government spending, while Agnello and Sousa (2009) observed 
significant linkages between deficit volatility and the level of economic development, 
political instability, and inflation, especially in countries with more trade openness. From a 
macro-fiscal point of view, Fatás and Mihov (2003) showed that numerical fiscal rules tend 
to lead to a lower degree of volatility in fiscal policy implementation.  
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the determinants of fiscal reaction 
functions in four ways. First, differently from most of the existing literature, we use the 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a measure of discretionary fiscal policy in a 
balanced panel of advanced and emerging market economies over two decades including the 
aftermath of the 2008-09 crisis. Second, we include a comprehensive set of economic, 
financial, demographic and institutional variables as potential determinants of fiscal policy 
behavior. Third, we augment the analysis of fiscal behavior by estimating the determinants of 
time-varying volatility of discretionary fiscal policy, as proxied by the standard deviation of 
the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Fourth, we adopt a dynamic panel estimation 
approach that corrects for biases associated with endogenous regressors and unobserved 
country-specific heterogeneity. 
 
III.   DATA 
We construct a panel dataset covering the period 1990–2012 and consisting of 49 
advanced and emerging market economies.
5 The panel includes 24 advanced and 25 
emerging market economies (Table A1). While the focus is on two groups of countries, we 
do not explore differences across regions or the influence of regional factors on fiscal policy. 
The dependent variable—the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance—is based on the 
IMF’s Public Finances in Modern History database, assembled from historical sources by 
Mauro et al. (2013).
6 We measure the volatility of fiscal policy behavior as the standard 
deviation of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance over two years, and estimate the 
output gap for each country by applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to decompose real 
GDP into trend and cyclical components (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). We test for the 
stationarity of the variables by applying the Im-Pesaran-Shin and Fisher-type unit root tests 
                                                 
5 A detailed description of data sources is presented in the Data Appendix.   
6 The source database covers an unbalanced panel of 55 countries (24 advanced and 31 emerging market 
economies) over the period 1800–2012 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/histdb/index.htm). 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/histdb/index.htm). This paper uses a balanced panel of 49 countries, 
excluding Bulgaria, Haiti, Iran, Nicaragua, Romania, and Russia from the original database due to missing 
observations.   7
for dynamic heterogonous panels.
7 The results, presented in Appendix Table A4, indicate 
significant test statistics to reject the presence of a unit root in the panel dataset. Additionally, 
we conduct a test for slope homogeneity using a bootstrapped Hausman test of poolability 
across advanced and developing countries, and find that the slope coefficients of country 
groups are similar so that poolability cannot be rejected.
8 
 
IV.   EMPIRICAL MODEL AND STRATEGY 
Following the existing literature, we model fiscal reaction functions using a range of 
potential determinants. We build on the model-based fiscal sustainability approach 
developed by Bohn (1998) and expanded by Fatás and Mihov (2003), Galí and Perotti 
(2003), and Alesina and Tabellini (2008). In our dynamic panel context, the estimated 
equation takes the following form: 
 
(1)  CAPB ,   	λ 	 	θCAPB ,     	 μ G D  ,     	 ρ O G  ,      	β  ,   	 γ    ,   	ε ,     
 
where CAPB ,  is the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance scaled by potential GDP in 
country i at time t, λ  is a country-specific intercept (fixed effect) accounting for 
heterogeneity, CAPB ,   is the lagged cyclically adjusted primary balance, GD ,    is gross 
government debt as a share of GDP in country i at time t-1,
9 OG ,    is the lagged output 
gap,
10   ,  represents a vector of macro-financial variables for country i at time t, including 
real GDP per capita, consumer price inflation, interest rates, real exchange rate, domestic 
credit, stock market capitalization, residential property prices, natural resource rents, and 
trade openness.   , 	denotes a matrix of demographic, institutional, and political variables, 
including population, old-age dependency ratio, a composite index of political regime type, 
measures of government fragmentation, bureaucratic quality, and corruption, and binary 
variables for crisis episodes, elections, fiscal rules and IMF programs. ε , 	is the error term. 
                                                 
7 Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix Table A3. In Appendix Table A4, we report 
results from the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test and Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests for unbalanced 
panels. The Im-Pesaran-Shin test has good small sample performance, while the Fisher-type test uses p-values 
obtained by Monte Carlo simulations from unit root tests for each cross-section. Unlike the Im-Pesaran-Shin 
test, the Fisher-type tests do not require a balanced panel. 
8 Conventional tests for slope homogeneity—such as a Chow test and the Roy-Zellner Wald-type χ
2—are less 
accurate and tend to reject poolability too often even when is true. Bun (2004) tests poolability on dynamic 
regressions and finds that the classical asymptotic tests tend to over-reject poolability, while bootstrap method 
tests are more accurate (see also Baltagi, 2008 and Di Iorio and Fachin, 2012). 
9 We also test the square and cubic function of government debt with the aim of capturing nonlinear effects of 
debt accumulation beyond a certain threshold, but find it to be an insignificant factor in the regressions. 
10 Some studies include the output gap at time t as a regressor, but we prefer the lagged output gap, as 
policymakers may react to past conditions. Moreover, there could be measurement errors in real time, which in 
turn suggests that data and forecast revisions influence fiscal policy behavior (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2008).   8
We also estimate the determinants of fiscal policy volatility, as measured by the 
standard deviation of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance. Using the above-
outlined model, we estimate the equation for the volatility of fiscal reaction functions in the 
following form: 
 
(2)  _CAPB ,   	λ 	 	θ _CAPB ,     	 μ G D  ,     	 ρ O G  ,     β    ,   	 γ    ,   	ε ,  
where  _CAPB ,  is the standard deviation of the cyclically adjusted primary balance in 
country i at time t,  _CAPB ,   is the lagged standard deviation of the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance, GD ,    is gross government debt as a share of GDP in country i at time t-1, 
OG ,    is the lagged output gap,    ,  represents a vector of economic and financial variables 
for country i at time t, including real GDP per capita, the standard deviation of real GDP 
growth, the level and standard deviation of inflation, the level and standard deviation of 
interest rates, the level and standard deviation of real exchange rate, domestic credit, the level 
and standard deviation of stock market capitalization, the level and standard deviation of 
residential property prices, natural resource rents, and trade openness.   , 	denotes the same 
set of demographic, institutional, and political variables as defined in Equation 1.  
 
We estimate these models using the system GMM estimator, which corrects for biases 
associated with endogenous regressors and country-specific heterogeneity. Econometric 
complications may emerge using the standard estimators, such as the pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method, because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error 
term, even if we assume that the disturbances are themselves not autocorrelated. One 
possible solution is the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), which corrects for potential biases associated with endogenous 
regressors and the persistence of the dependent variable. Although the two-step system 
GMM estimator is superior in estimating regression models with instrumental variables, it is 
less reliable in small samples and systematically underestimates the real standard deviation of 
the estimates compared to the one-step system GMM estimator (Blundell, Bond, and 
Windmeijer, 2000). Therefore, we prefer the one-step approach in our benchmark estimations 
and present empirical findings based on the two-step estimator as a robustness check.
11 
 
V.   INTERPRETING EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
We present empirical findings based on a standard model of fiscal sustainability 
applying alternative estimation techniques. The empirical findings on the determinants of 
fiscal reaction functions and volatility of fiscal policy are discussed below in Section A and 
                                                 
11 With the two-step system GMM model, we test the robustness to the reduction of instruments by collapsing 
the instrument set as suggested by Roodman (2009) and implementing a small sample correction procedure 
recommended by Windmeijer (2005).   9
B, respectively. We estimate a standard model of fiscal sustainability—relating the cyclically 
adjusted primary budget balance to its lagged value, lagged government debt, and the lagged 
output gap—and present the complete set of the results in Table 1.
12 In Tables 2–4, we 
present our findings based on the system GMM estimation methodology and using a list of 
potential determinants of fiscal reaction functions.
13 Using a balanced panel, we present two 
different versions of our benchmark specifications estimated with the one-step system GMM 
approach in the first and second columns of Tables 2–4 and with the two-step system GMM 
estimator in the sixth and seventh columns. In Table 5, we present the estimation results for 
the determinants of fiscal policy volatility, following the same multivariate panel regression 
approach using one- and two-step system GMM estimators.  
 
A.   Determinants of Fiscal Policy Behavior 
Discretionary fiscal policy has a considerable degree of persistence both in advanced 
and emerging market economies. The lagged cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient across all specifications of the model, as 
presented in Tables 1 and 2. The extent of policy inertia is also evident when we estimate 
fiscal reaction functions separately for advanced and emerging market economies during the 
period 1990–2012, as presented in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. Although there are 
small differences between group coefficients relative to their standard errors, the lagged 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance appears to have a greater effect on fiscal policy 
behavior in advanced economies (0.8–0.9) than in emerging market economies (0.6–0.7).  
 
The fiscal policy stance takes into account the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint and, therefore, long-run solvency concerns. According to Bohn (1998), the 
coefficient of the debt variable in the model of fiscal reaction functions must be greater than 
zero to ensure the sustainability of government finances. As predicted by the theoretical 
model, we find that the coefficient on public debt is positive and statistically significant in 
most specifications. This positive response of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 
to a higher stock of public debt is a robust indication of a pattern of fiscal policy behavior 
that takes into account the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and, therefore, long-
run fiscal solvency concerns. Furthermore, we observe a similar pattern of behavior when we 
estimate fiscal reaction functions separately for advanced and emerging market economies, 
although the fiscal policy response to the level of public debt is stronger in advanced 
economies than in emerging market economies.
                                                 
12 Reduced-form fiscal reaction functions are estimated using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and one- and 
two-step system GMM estimators.   
13 All specifications are based on a balanced panel, with the exception of specifications in the third and fifth 
columns of Tables 2–4. Our panel becomes unbalanced only when we include long-term bond yields and 
residential property prices, which are not significant factors in both columns.  
1
0
 
 
Table 1. Fiscal Reaction Functions 
Panel Specification 
/4
GLS 
1/ GLS 
1/ SYS 
GMM 
2/
SYS 
GMM 
2/
2S-SYS 
GMM 
3/
2S-SYS 
GMM 
3/ GLS 
1/ GLS 
1/ SYS 
GMM 
2/
SYS 
GMM 
2/
2S-SYS 
GMM 
3/
2S-SYS 
GMM 
3/ GLS 
1/ GLS 
1/ SYS 
GMM 
2/
SYS 
GMM 
2/
2S-SYS 
GMM 
3/
2S-SYS 
GMM 
3/
Lagged CAPB 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.81*** 0.78*** 0.83*** 0.81*** 0.91*** 0.90*** 0.86*** 0.90*** 0.66*** 0.68*** 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.63*** 0.68***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Lagged debt 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 -0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01*** 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
Output gap -0.07*** -0.09** -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08*** -0.11** -0.06
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
Lagged output gap
-0.11*** -0.16*** 0.01 -0.12*** -
0.26***
0.03 -0.09*** -0.10** -0.06
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08)
Adjusted R
2 0.76 0.75 - - - - 0.80 0.79 - - - - 0.70 0.70 - - - -
Number of countries  49  49  49 49 49 49 24 24 24 24 24 24 26 25 25 25 25 25
Number of years 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Notes: 
1/ Specifications are estimated with the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) assume no constant, the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity, country-specific fixed effects are included and error term is assumed to follow an 
AR (1) process.
2/ Specifications are estimated with the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) assume three lags robust standard errors in parenthesis are consistent to panel specific heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
3/ Specifications are estimated with the two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) assuming collapsed instrument matrix, two lags and finite sample corrected standard errors
4/ Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis ***, ** and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Authors' estimations.
Advanced All Countries Developing
Dependent variable: Cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB)   11 
 
Discretionary fiscal policy tends to be procyclical both in advanced and emerging 
market economies. The lagged output gap has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in most specifications of the model, indicating that the policy stance tends to be 
procyclical. This empirical result is in contradiction to both the standard Keynesian 
predictions and the tax-smoothing theory, but aligns with a large body of empirical studies 
that finds a pattern of procyclical behavior. Contrary to most of the previous literature, 
however, we find that the estimated coefficient on the lagged output gap tends to be of a 
larger magnitude in advanced economies, compared to emerging market economies, which 
indicates that the degree of procyclicality is greater in advanced economies. 
 
The inclusion of the contemporaneous output gap, instead of the lagged output gap, 
points towards countercyclical behavior. This finding is consistent with studies that use 
real time data instead of ex post observations.
14 Following the approach implemented by 
Bernoth, Hallet, and Lewis (2008) and Cimadomo (2012), we take the previous year’s 
projections (t-1) for the output gap and cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as 
reported in years (t) in the December issues of the OECD Economic Outlook, and estimate 
our model for 19 OECD countries (which form a subset of our full panel). The coefficients 
remain similar in size and significance, but the results indicate that the coefficient on the 
output gap becomes positive when fiscal policy reaction functions are estimated with real 
time data. One explanation is that OECD countries tend to plan a countercyclical fiscal 
strategy, which can turn out to be procyclical in implementation for a variety of reasons 
including forecast errors, delays in implementation, and policy divergence. 
 
Economic development and, to a lesser extent, consumer price inflation influence fiscal 
reaction functions. The coefficient on per capita income indicates that the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance increases, on average, by about 0.3–0.4 percentage points with each 
percentage point increase in the level of real GDP per capita. This finding is consistent with 
previous empirical studies that estimate income elasticity in an interval of 0.3–0.6, and 
suggests a more procyclical fiscal reaction. Furthermore, the results indicate that the positive 
coefficient on per capita income is of a marginally larger magnitude in advanced economies 
than in emerging market economies. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on inflation 
varies with specifications, and remains weakly significant. In particular, the impact of 
inflation on discretionary fiscal policy becomes less robust when we estimate the model 
separately for advanced and emerging market economies. While the coefficient remains 
positive and mostly significant for advanced economies, it turns out to be negative, but 
statistically insignificant, in one of the specifications for emerging market economies. 
                                                 
14 An emerging strand of the empirical literature on fiscal reaction functions, using real time data instead of ex 
post observations, finds countercyclical fiscal behavior, especially in advanced economies (see, for example, 
Forni and Momigliano, 2004; Golinelli and Momigliano, 2006; Cimadomo, 2007; Bernoth, Hallet, and Lewis, 
2008). Although real time data may yield empirically better performing descriptions of fiscal policy behavior, 
such figures are available only for a limited number of mostly advanced economies.  12 
 
 
Financial developments appear to exert a significant effect on discretionary fiscal policy 
in advanced and emerging market economies. The extent of financial development, 
measured by the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, tends to have two opposing effects on the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance: enabling deficit financing while imposing market 
discipline on fiscal policy behavior. In this context, short-term interest rates appear to have a 
statistically significant influence, but their economic magnitude is negligible across various 
specifications. The impact of short-term interest rates is significantly greater in advanced 
economies than in developing countries, suggesting stronger linkages between monetary and 
fiscal policymaking in advanced economies. Long-term bond yields, on the other hand, do 
not appear to be an empirically important factor when we estimate the model for the full set 
of countries. However, our dataset becomes unbalanced when we introduce long-term bond 
yields into the model, because of limited data availability in emerging market economies. 
Indeed, when the model is estimated for the sample of advanced countries, long-term bond 
yields turn out to have a positive, but still statistically insignificant effect, which may reflect 
market discipline (i.e. fiscal consolidation efforts when the cost of debt service increases). 
Likewise, we find that stock market capitalization and property prices have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on fiscal policy behavior across all countries, albeit the 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance is not corrected for asset price changes.
15  
 
Structural features of the economy tend to be an important determinant of 
discretionary fiscal policy. While trade openness appears to have no significant effect, 
change in terms of trade turns out to be an important determinant of the cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance, particularly in emerging market economies.
16 We also find that 
resource dependence—measured by natural resource rents as a share of GDP—tends to have 
a statistically significant effect on the fiscal policy stance. This result, however, should not be 
taken as an indication of prudent fiscal behavior in natural resource–rich countries. Indeed, 
our dependent variable—the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance—may not 
appropriately measure the fiscal stance in economies, where commodity price cycles tend to 
have a significant bearing on fiscal outcomes.
17 Moreover, the findings indicate that real 
exchange rate appreciation has a statistically significant negative effect on fiscal behavior, 
which possibly reflects the fall in revenues in local currency terms when the exchange rate 
appreciates. Finally, the old-age-dependency ratio appears to influence fiscal policy behavior, 
                                                 
15 Although the effect of residential property prices turns out to be negative in our sample of developing 
countries, this could be a dubious result because of limited data availability. 
16 The growth literature shows that terms-of-trade shocks are a key determinant of macroeconomic performance 
in developing countries (see, for example, Cashin and Pattillo, 2000). Indeed, the estimated coefficient on trade 
openness is negative in the case of emerging market economies, which may be a reflection of a higher degree of 
vulnerability to external shocks. 
17 A better measure of the fiscal stance in resource–rich countries is the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
excluding resource-based revenues, but these figures are not readily available for our sample of countries.   13 
 
 
with a reasonably negative and statistically significant coefficient. Its economic magnitude is 
greater among advanced economies, which tend to have a less favorable demographic profile. 
 
Institutional and political factors appear to influence fiscal behavior, varying in 
direction and degrees of magnitude. Government fragmentation has no strong effect on 
fiscal policy in advanced economies, but becomes empirically significant in emerging market 
economies. On the other hand, political regime type—measured by a composite index 
ranging from autocracy to democracy—is not a statistically significant factor in determining 
fiscal policy behavior in advanced and emerging market economies. The impact of electoral 
cycles on discretionary fiscal policy decisions, as measured by a binary variable that takes 
the value of 1 in the year preceding elections to capture opportunistic behavior, does not 
appear to be statistically significant.
18 We also find that the quality of bureaucratic 
institutions has a positive and statistically significant effect on discretionary fiscal policy, 
suggesting that better institutions are associated with a more prudent structural fiscal 
position. Likewise, corruption—measured by an index ranging from 0 (most corrupt) to 6 
(least corrupt)—turns out to be a statistically significant factor. That is, a lower degree of 
corruption improves the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Furthermore, we find that the 
interaction of government fragmentation and corruption is a significant factor, indicating a 
higher degree of vulnerability to corruption in a politically fragmented environment.  
 
Crisis episodes have a large and statistically significant effect on fiscal policy behavior 
across all countries. The fiscal impact of crisis episodes, as measured by a dummy variable 
for banking, currency and debt crises, appears to be larger in advanced economies, but is still 
substantial in emerging market economies. Furthermore, fiscal reaction functions tend to 
differ during periods of crisis compared to pre-crisis periods. Using the full set of advanced 
and emerging market economies, we compare three different subperiods—the 1990s, 2000–
07 and 2008–12—and present the results in Appendix Table A5.
19 The findings indicate that 
the degree of persistence in discretionary fiscal policy (as measured by the coefficient on the 
lagged cyclically adjusted primary balance) is significantly greater in the post-crisis period. 
While turning even more procyclical after the 2008-09 crisis, fiscal policy behavior appears 
to have become less responsive to the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and, 
therefore, long-run fiscal solvency concerns. We also check the interaction of crisis episodes 
and government debt and find a negative coefficient, as expected. Even though it is not 
empirically significant, this result implies that crisis episodes have a more pronounced fiscal 
impact in countries with a higher level of indebtedness.  
  
                                                 
18 Although the literature tends to focus on pre-electoral expansionary fiscal policies, the results do not change 
when we include the election dummy without a lag.  
19Additional tests are performed for parameter consistency and homogeneity during three subperiods.  14 
 
 
Table 2. Determinants of Fiscal Reaction Functions—All Countries 
 
 
 
123456 7
Cyclically adjusted primary  0.816*** 0.787*** 0.792*** 0.810*** 0.853*** 0.805*** 0.728***
[0.046] [0.050] [0.062] [0.050] [0.052] [0.067] [0.054]
Gross government debt (t-1) 0.003* 0.018* 0.020* 0.006 0.025** 0.008 0.008
[0.002] [0.010] [0.011] [0.005] [0.010] [0.008] [0.035]
Output gap (t-1) -0.163** -0.119*** -0.113*** -0.143** -0.188*** 0.008 0.047
[0.031] [0.036] [0.032] [0.033] [0.061] [0.072] [0.091]
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.261** 0.435**
[0.122] [0.189]
Inflation 0.030 0.141**
[0.019] [0.066]
Short-term interest rate 0.001** -0.001* 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Real exchange rate -0.006 0.001 -0.006* -0.015***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005]
Change in terms of trade 0.023*
[0.012]
Domestic credit (log) -0.613*** -0.347* -0.908*** -0.624
[0.215] [0.202] [0.314] [0.430]
Stock market capitalization 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.007*
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Population (log) -0.146**
[0.068]
Corruption 0.240***
[0.077]
Bureaucratic quality 0.337*
[0.198]
Crisis -0.966** -1.305**
[0.421] [0.528]
IMF-supported program 0.573* 0.642** 0.767
[0.285] [0.242] [0.714]
Number of observations 1171 1073 874 1078 565 1171 1073
Number of countries 49 48 43 49 32 49 48
Specification tests (p-values) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.046 0.000 0.001
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.753 0.893 0.923 0.907 0.249 0.773 0.916
Hansen-Sargent test 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.060 0.054
Source: Authors' estimations.
4/ *, **, *** indicates significance at 10 percent (p<0.10), 5 percent (p<0.05) and 1 percent (p<0.01), respectively.
Notes : 
1/ The table reports one- and two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ package in 
Stata. The one-step estimation uses three lags with robust standard errors in brackets, consistent to panel specific 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The two-step estimation uses collapsed instrument matrix, two lags and finite sample 
corrected standard errors in brackets. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests report the p-values for the first and second order residual 
autocorrelation in the first differenced equation, providing no evidence for significant second order autocorrelation. Hansen-
Sargent test for overindentifying restrictions provides the probability value for H0. joint validity of the instruments. Higher 
probability value suggests that the instruments are exogenous and not correlated with the error term. The test is robust but 
grows weaker with higher the number of moment conditions. 
Dependent variable: Cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (t)
one-step GMM estimation two-step GMM 
ti ti
3/ Regressions include the following control variables -  long term bond yield, trade openness, property prices, natural 
resource rents, old age dependency ratio, regime*fragmentation, fragmentation*corruption, lagged election and fiscal rule, 
which were found to be insignificant.        
2/ All results in the table are presented in easily comparable format. Regressions 1 and 2 (one step GMM) have exactly the 
same specification as regressions 6 and 7 (two steps GMM).           15 
 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Fiscal Reaction Functions—Advanced Countries 
 
 
 
12345 6 7
Cyclically adjusted primary  0.909*** 0.855*** 0.900*** 0.886*** 0.824*** 0.855*** 0.826***
[0.036] [0.070] [0.041] [0.054] [0.066] [0.089] [0.083]
Gross government debt (t-1) 0.003* 0.018** 0.024*** 0.010* 0.021** 0.004 0.049
[0.002] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.009] [0.004] [0.033]
Output gap (t-1) -0.262*** -0.178*** -0.223*** -0.218*** -0.242*** 0.033 0.085
[0.039] [0.046] [0.047] [0.037] [0.063] [0.091] [0.097]
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.222 0.532*
[0.168] [0.272]
Inflation 0.163* 0.296**
[0.082] [0.093]
Short-term inerest rate 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.070
[0.030] [0.022] [0.063]
Real exchange rate 0.002 0.015 -0.014*** -0.014
[0.014] [0.010] [0.004] [0.022]
Domestic credit (log) -0.894** -0.628** -0.698* -1.139**
[0.367] [0.287] [0.366] [0.494]
Stock market capitalization 0.009*** 0.007** 0.008** 0.009***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Natural resource rents 0.172*** 0.129*** 0.214** 0.266***
[0.059] [0.038] [0.080] [0.062]
Population (log) -0.137**
[0.067]
Old age dependency ratio -0.026 -0.052* -0.132
[0.040] [0.025] [0.084]
Crisis -1.070** -1.151***
[0.550] [0.593]
IMF-supported program 3.457* 3.203** 1.530
[1.734] [1.500] [1.505]
Number of observations 552 517 507 506 473 552 517
Number of groups 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Specification tests (p-values) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.047 0.047 0.049 0.058 0.068 0.028 0.030
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.475 0.228 0.321 0.301 0.289 0.450 0.192
Hansen-Sargent test 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.580 0.585
Source: Authors' estimations.
4/ *, **, *** indicates significance at 10 percent (p<0.10), 5 percent (p<0.05) and 1 percent (p<0.01), respectively.
Notes : 
1/ The table reports one- and two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ package 
in Stata. The one-step estimation uses three lags with robust standard errors in brackets, consistent to panel specific 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The two-step estimation uses collapsed instrument matrix, two lags and finite 
sample corrected standard errors in brackets. For all estimations the difference-in-Hansen test reports the p-values for the 
null hypothesis of additional moment conditions validity.  The AR(1) and AR(2) tests report the p-values for the first and 
second order residual autocorrelation in the first differenced equation, providing no evidence for significant second order 
autocorrelation. Hansen-Sargent test for overindentifying restrictions provides the probability value for H0. joint validity of the 
instruments. Higher probability value suggests that the instruments are exogenous and not correlated with the error term. 
The test is robust but grows weaker with higher the number of moment conditions. 
Dependent variable: Cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (t)
one-step GMM estimation two-step GMM 
3/ Regressions include the following control variables -  long term bond yield, trade openness, chnage in terms of trade, 
property prices, government fragmentation, regime*fragmentation, fragmentation*corruption, corruption, bureaucratic quality, 
lagged election and fiscal rule, which were found to be insignificant.        
2/ All results in the table are presented in easily comparable format. Regressions 1 and 2 (one step GMM) have exactly the 
same specification as regressions 6 and 7 (two steps GMM).           16 
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Fiscal Reaction Functions—Emerging Markets 
 
 
12345 6 7
Cyclically adjusted primary  0.674*** 0.632*** 0.600*** 0.649*** 0.606*** 0.628*** 0.662***
[0.085] [0.081] [0.108] [0.089] [0.113] [0.077] [0.068]
Gross government debt (t-1) 0.005 0.016* 0.019*** 0.011* 0.052*** 0.027* 0.047**
[0.003] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.015] [0.014] [0.019]
Output gap (t-1) -0.103** -0.071 -0.091* -0.071** 0.025 -0.062 0.200
[0.042] [0.042] [0.046] [0.037] [0.086] [0.076] [0.075]
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.357*** 0.423
[0.125] [0.210]
Inflation 0.038** -0.058
[0.015] [0.060]
Short-term interest rate 0.000** -0.001** 0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Real exchange rate -0.010** -0.006** -0.006*** -0.008
[0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.006]
Change in terms of trade 0.024**
[0.009]
Domestic credit (log) -0.572*** -0.077 0.304 -0.844**
[0.187] [0.182] [0.417] [0.380]
Stock market capitalization 0.106** 0.011** 0.006** 0.018***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.006]
Property prices (log) -0.594**
[0.182]
Natural resource rents 0.023 0.029** -0.017 0.039*
[0.156] [0.013] [0.033] [0.022]
Old age dependency ratio -0.065** 0.002 -0.048
[0.026] [0.025] [0.039]
Government fragmentation 1.275**
[0.559]
Crisis -0.085 -2.136***
[0.414] [0.467]
IMF-supported program 0.382* 0.415* 0.024
[0.222] [0.206] [0.344]
Number of observations 619 556 367 572 92 619 556
Number of groups 26 25 20 26 9 26 25
Specification tests (p-values) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.069 0.003 0.006
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.457 0.482 0.498 0.489 0.699 0.466 0.530
Hansen-Sargent test 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.212 0.161
Source: Authors' estimations.
4/ *, **, *** indicates significance at 10 percent (p<0.10), 5 percent (p<0.05) and 1 percent (p<0.01), respectively.
Notes : 
1/ The table reports one- and two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ package in 
Stata. The one-step estimation uses three lags with robust standard errors in brackets, consistent to panel specific 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The two-step estimation uses collapsed instrument matrix, two lags and finite 
sample corrected standard errors in brackets. For all estimations the difference-in-Hansen test reports the p-values for the 
null hypothesis of additional moment conditions validity.  The AR(1) and AR(2) tests report the p-values for the first and 
second order residual autocorrelation in the first differenced equation, providing no evidence for significant second order 
autocorrelation. Hansen-Sargent test for overindentifying restrictions provides the probability value for H0. joint validity of the 
instruments. Higher probability value suggests that the instruments are exogenous and not correlated with the error term. 
The test is robust but grows weaker with  higher the number of moment conditions. 
Dependent variable: Cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (t)
one-step GMM estimation two-step GMM 
ii
3/ Regressions include the following control variables -  long term bond yield, trade openness, population, 
regime*fragmentation, fragmentation*corruption, corruption, bureaucratic quality,lagged  election and fiscal rule, which were 
found to be insignificant.        
2/ All results in the table are presented in easily comparable format. Regressions 1 and 2 (one step GMM) have exactly the 
same specification as regressions 6 and 7 (two steps GMM).           17 
 
Table 5. Determinants of Fiscal Policy Volatility—All Countries 
 
 
  
 
two-step GMM 
estimation
12 3 4
SD of cyclically adjusted primary  0.292*** 0.228*** 0.251** 0.171***
[0.060] [0.071] [0.088] [0.056]
Gross government debt (t-1) 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.020
[0.007] [0.004] [0.007] [0.016]
Output gap (t-1) 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.093*** 0.024
[0.018] [0.015] [0.020] [0.030]
SD of real GDP growth  0.011 0.051*
[0.028] [0.021]
SD of real exchange rate 0.020** 0.014 0.023***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
Natural resource rents 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.039**
[0.012] [0.015] [0.015]
Bureaucratic quality -0.267**
[0.113]
Fiscal rule -0.442***
[0.161]
Number of observations/countries 1025/48 1025/48 1076/49 1025/48
Number of instruments 129 131 129 11
Specification tests (p-values) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.869 0.930 0.569 0.796
Hansen-Sargent test 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.106
Source: Authors' estimations.
Dependent variable: Standard Deviation (SD) of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (t)
4/ *, **, *** indicates significance at 10% (P<0.10), 5% (P<0.05) and 1% (P<0.01) respectively.
one-step GMM estimation
Notes : 
1/ The table reports one and two -step System GMM dynamic panel estimations carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ 
package in Stata (Roodman, 2009). The one-step System GMM uses three lags with robust standard errors in 
brackets, consistent to panel specific heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The two-step System GMM model 
uses collapsed instrument matrix, two lags and only one instrument for each variable. Windmeijer (2005) finite 
sample corrected standard errors in brackets are employed. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests report the p-values for the 
first and second order residual autocorrelation in the first differenced equation, providing no evidence for significant 
second order autocorrelation.Hansen-Sargent test for overindentifying restrictions provides the probability value for 
H0. joint validity of the instruments. Higher probability value suggests that the instruments are exogenous and not 
correlated with the error term. The test is robust but grows weaker the higher the number of moment conditions. 
3/ Regressions include the following control variables - real GDP per capita, standard deviation of cpi, trade 
openness,domestic credit, standard deviation of stock market cap., government fragmentation, corruption, and 
crisis, which were found to be insignificant.   
2/ All results in the table are presented in easily comparable format. Regression 1 (one-step GMM) have exactly 
the same specification as regression 4 (two-steps GMM).                  18 
 
 
Table 6. Determinants of Fiscal Policy Volatility—Advanced Countries 
 
 
  
  
two-step GMM 
estimation
12 3 4
SD of cyclically adjusted primary  0.253*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.218**
[0.066] [0.074] [0.056] [0.091]
Gross government debt (t-1) 0.007 0.009** 0.010** 0.018
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.025]
Output gap (t-1) 0.061** 0.054** 0.075*** 0.030
[0.029] [0.024] [0.022] [0.055]
SD of real GDP growth  0.084* 0.089**
[0.049] [0.043]
Natural resource rents 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.073**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.042]
Number of observations/countries 494/23 494/23 506/23 494/23
Number of instruments 129 131 129 11
Specification tests (p-values) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.466 0.455 0.483 0.474
Hansen-Sargent test 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.058
Source: Authors' estimations.
Notes : 
1/ The table reports one and two -step System GMM dynamic panel estimations carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ 
package in Stata (Roodman, 2009). The one-step System GMM uses three lags with robust standard errors in 
brackets, consistent to panel specific heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The two-step System GMM model 
uses collapsed instrument matrix, two lags and only one instrument for each variable. Windmeijer (2005) finite 
sample corrected standard errors in brackets are employed. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests report the p-values for the 
first and second order residual autocorrelation in the first differenced equation, providing no evidence for significant 
second order autocorrelation.Hansen-Sargent test for overindentifying restrictions provides the probability value for 
H0. joint validity of the instruments. Higher probability value suggests that the instruments are exogenous and not 
correlated with the error term. The test is robust but grows weaker the higher the number of moment conditions. 
4/ *, **, *** indicates significance at 10% (P<0.10), 5% (P<0.05) and 1% (P<0.01) respectively.
Dependent variable: Standard Deviation (SD) of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (t)
one-step GMM estimation
3/ Regressions include the following control variables - real GDP per capita, standard deviation of cpi,standard 
deviation of real exchange rate, trade openness,domestic credit, standard deviation of stock market cap., 
government fragmentation, corruption,bureaucratic quality, crisis and fiscal rule, which were found to be 
insignificant.   
2/ All results in the table are presented in easily comparable format. Regression 1 (one-step GMM) have exactly 
the same specification as regression 4 (two-steps GMM).      19 
 
 
Table 7. Determinants of Fiscal Policy Volatility— Emerging Markets 
 
 
 
  
two-step GMM 
estimation
12 3 4
SD of cyclically adjusted primary  0.266*** 0.241** 0.293*** 0.144**
[0.083] [0.090] [0.125] [0.057]
Gross government debt (t-1) 0.016** 0.014*** 0.016** 0.020**
[0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008]
Output gap (t-1) 0.080** 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.026
[0.025] [0.019] [0.022] [0.030]
SD of real exchange rate 0.019** 0.020* 0.023***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.007]
SD of stock market capitalization 0.013** 0.009 0.013*
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008]
Natural resource rents 0.033*** 0.037** 0.067
[0.013] [0.016] [0.034]
Number of observations/countries 531/25 531/25 570/26 531/25
Number of instruments 129 131 129 11
Specification tests (p-values) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.011
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.238 0.278 0.340 0.444
Hansen-Sargent test 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.675
Source: Authors' estimations.
Notes : 
1/ The table reports one and two -step System GMM dynamic panel estimations carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ 
package in Stata (Roodman, 2009). The one-step System GMM uses three lags with robust standard errors in brackets, 
consistent to panel specific heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The two-step System GMM model uses collapsed 
instrument matrix, two lags and only one instrument for each variable. Windmeijer (2005) finite sample corrected 
standard errors in brackets are employed. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests report the p-values for the first and second order 
residual autocorrelation in the first differenced equation, providing no evidence for significant second order 
autocorrelation.Hansen-Sargent test for overindentifying restrictions provides the probability value for H0. joint validity of 
the instruments. Higher probability value suggests that the instruments are exogenous and not correlated with the error 
term. The test is robust but grows weaker the higher the number of moment conditions. 
4/ *, **, *** indicates significance at 10% (P<0.10), 5% (P<0.05) and 1% (P<0.01) respectively.
Dependent variable: Standard Deviation (SD) of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (t)
one-step GMM estimation
3/ Regressions include the following control variables - real GDP per capita,standard deviation of real GDP,  standard 
deviation of cpi, trade openness,domestic credit, government fragmentation, corruption, bureaucratic quality, crisis and 
fiscal rule, which were found to be insignificant.   
2/ All results in the table are presented in easily comparable format. Regression 1 (one-step GMM) have exactly the 
same specification as regression 4 (two-steps GMM).      20 
 
 
IMF-supported stabilization programs tend to have a significant effect on fiscal 
behavior, while fiscal rules turn out to play an insignificant role. IMF-supported 
stabilization programs have a statistically significant effect on fiscal policy behavior across 
various specifications of the model. This finding remains valid when we estimate the model 
separately for subsamples of advanced and emerging market economies. Fiscal rules, on the 
other hand, come out to be statistically insignificant in our broad set of countries. This may, 
however, reflect the fact that most fiscal rules in our sample are not defined in terms of the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance, which is our measure of fiscal policy behavior.  
 
B.   Determinants of Fiscal Policy Volatility 
Higher public debt leads to more volatile fiscal behavior, while fiscal rules and higher 
institutional quality reduce volatility of fiscal policy. As presented in Tables 5–7, the 
lagged volatility of the cyclically adjusted primary balance has a positive and empirically 
significant coefficient across all specifications of the model, indicating a high degree of 
persistence in the volatility of fiscal policy reaction functions over time. The extent of policy 
volatility appears to be higher in emerging market economies, but still economically 
substantial in advanced economies as well. The level of public debt and the lagged output 
gap have statistically significant and positive coefficients, indicating that higher government 
debt or output gap (i.e. above-potential growth) lead to more volatile policy behavior. Real 
GDP growth volatility has a positive and empirically significant coefficient, particularly in 
the case of advanced economies, while the volatility of consumer price inflation appears to 
be insignificant across all countries. Fiscal policy volatility is higher in the presence of 
natural resource rents, real exchange rate volatility, and stock market volatility, especially in 
emerging market economies. On the other hand, we find that fiscal rules and higher 
institutional quality reduce volatility of fiscal policy, while crisis episodes do not appear to 
have a statistically significant effect on the volatility of fiscal policy behavior.
20  
 
The empirical results remain robust when we use an alternative measure of 
discretionary fiscal policy volatility. Following Fatás and Mihov (2003), we introduce an 
alternative regression-based measure of average volatility of policy changes using the 
standard deviation of the residuals from country-specific regressions (Appendix Table A6). 
The residuals quantitatively estimate discretionary fiscal policy and are drawn from the 
estimated fiscal reaction function of the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance on its lagged value, 
lagged government debt, and lagged output gap. We find that the lagged volatility of 
discretionary fiscal policy has a positive and significant effect on the cyclically adjusted 
fiscal balance volatility, supporting the results in Table 5. These results are also robust to the 
                                                 
20 This is broadly in line with other studies estimating the impact of fiscal rules on discretionary policymaking.  
For example, Fatás and Mihov (2003), Woo (2009), and Brzozowski and Siwinska-Gorzelak (2010) find that 
formal constraints tend to lower the volatility of government spending.  21 
 
 
subsamples of advanced and developing countries as the volatility of discretionary fiscal 
policy is, with somewhat smaller magnitude, in advanced economies. 
 
VI.   ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We perform several specification tests in order to ensure the validity of the system 
GMM estimations. First, we estimate alternative specifications including additional 
determinants and arrive at results similar to the baseline models, presented in the first and 
second columns of Tables 2–4. Second, since the one-step system GMM estimator becomes 
weaker when the number of instruments increases, we test the second and third lags of the 
endogenous variable to avoid the problem of invalid instruments (correlated with the error 
term) or weak instruments (only weakly correlated with explanatory variables). Third, we test 
the robustness of our benchmark one-step system GMM estimator by comparing three 
different time periods—the 1990s, 2000–08 and 2009–12 (Appendix Table A5). Fourth, we 
consider a two-step system GMM estimator, as presented in the last two columns of Tables 
2–4, to test the sensitivity of our empirical findings to different GMM estimators. 
 
The two-step system GMM is defined as an alternative model, testing a reduced number 
of instruments to avoid overidentification while ensuring validity. The two-step estimator 
is more efficient but can be biased downwards for finite sample inference. We follow 
Roodman (2009) and estimate the baseline model with two lags and a collapsed instrument 
matrix, which specifies an instrument for each variable and reduces the size of the instrument 
matrix by a smaller set of moment conditions. The covariance matrix is robust to the panel-
specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity improved with the finite sample corrected 
standard errors developed by Windmeijer (2005). The two-step estimates in Tables 2–4, 
appear to be consistent in direction and size with the results from the one-step analysis 
forming a downward interval limit with coefficient that lies between the two bounds given in 
the sixth and seventh columns and the first and second columns. Some coefficients are not 
significant when estimated with the two-step GMM model compared to the one-step GMM 
suggesting the possibility that too many instruments overfit the model (i.e., instrument 
proliferation problem) resulting in upward-biased estimates. 
 
The test results are robust across all regressions, indicating that our instruments are 
valid, but weaken with a higher number of instruments. All model specifications satisfy 
the test statistics for overidentifying restrictions in the instrumental variables, although the 
number of instruments may be large relative to the number of groups in the one-step 
approach. Considering that the validity of the instrument set depends on the error structure, 
we also report the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests AR(1) and AR(2) with p-values for first 
and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first-differenced equation. All in all, the 
tests provide evidence for high first-order autocorrelation—the AR (1) rejects the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation—but no evidence for significant second-order 
autocorrelation—higher p-value of the AR(2) statistics—suggesting correctly specified  22 
 
 
models. Finally, we include the Hansen-Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions to check 
the joint validity of the instruments. The probability values for the null hypothesis—that is, 
the instruments are valid—are presented in the last row of each table. Higher probability 
value suggests that the instruments are exogenous and not correlated with the error term. The 
test is robust across all regressions, indicating that our instruments are valid, but the test 
becomes weaker with a higher number of instruments.
21  
 
VII.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the main determinants of discretionary fiscal policy and its 
volatility in advanced and emerging market economies. The state of public finances 
deteriorated significantly in the aftermath of the 2008-09 economic crisis. While these 
extraordinary developments have generally been blamed on fiscal stimulus packages, the 
severity of the economic downturn, and the bailout of financial institutions, there is no 
systematic time-series estimates of fiscal reaction functions for a large panel of advanced and 
emerging market economies over the period 1990-2012. Accordingly, this paper investigates 
the main determinants of discretionary fiscal policy, as measured by the cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance, and its time-varying volatility. In view of omitted variables bias and 
potential endogeneity problems that plague standard econometric techniques commonly used 
in the empirical literature, this paper adopts a dynamic panel approach based on the system 
GMM estimator and uses a balanced panel that yields more robust estimations than 
unbalanced panels. 
 
The empirical results suggest that discretionary fiscal policy is influenced by a range of 
macro-financial and institutional factors. In line with the existing literature, we show that 
discretionary fiscal policy is influenced by policy inertia, the level of public debt, and the 
output gap in both advanced and emerging market economies, although the fiscal policy 
response to debt accumulation is stronger in advanced economies than in emerging market 
economies. In addition, we find that macro-financial factors—such as real exchange rate, 
financial development, interest rates, asset prices, and natural resource rents—and 
demographic and institutional factors—such as the old-age dependency ratio, the quality of 
institutions, and policy anchors such as fiscal rules and IMF-supported stabilization 
programs—tend to have a significant influence fiscal behavior. The empirical results indicate 
that these abovementioned factors tend to influence discretionary fiscal policy differently in 
advanced and emerging market economies. Moreover, we show that the degree of policy 
inertia is significantly greater in the post-crisis period, with fiscal behavior turning more 
procyclical and becoming less responsive to the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint. With regards to the volatility of fiscal policymaking, the results indicate that 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that having a large number of moment conditions can overfit the endogenous variables, 
weakening Hansen tests of instrument validity (Roodman, 2009).  23 
 
 
higher government debt leads to more volatile policy behavior, while fiscal rules and higher 
institutional quality reduce volatility of fiscal policy. 
 
Policymakers should aim for a countercyclical fiscal policy stance that takes into 
account long-run solvency concerns. The empirical results presented in this paper have a 
number of critical policy implications, as countries continue to struggle with putting public 
finances on a growth-enhancing and sustainable path. First, discretionary fiscal policy tends 
to exhibit a pattern of procyclical behavior both in advanced and emerging market 
economies, worsening, instead of smoothing out, macro-financial oscillations. Second, 
although the fiscal policy stance appears to take into account the government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint across all countries in our sample, the policy response to the level of public 
debt is stronger in advanced economies than in emerging market economies. In the aftermath 
of the 2008-09 crisis, however, fiscal policy behavior has become more procyclical and less 
responsive to the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and, therefore, long-run fiscal 
solvency concerns, especially in advanced economies. In this context, the results show that 
the policymakers need to take into account financial developments, such as the fluctuations 
in stock market capitalization and property prices, that tend to have a significant effect on 
fiscal policy behavior. Likewise, improving the quality of bureaucratic institutions is a 
necessary condition to have an effective fiscal policy framework, especially against the risk 
of corruption in a politically fragmented environment. Finally, even though fiscal rules do 
not appear to be an empirically significant determinant of fiscal policy behavior, a rule-based 
fiscal regime is still found to reduce the volatility of fiscal policy over time. 
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Appendix. Data 
 
Economic and financial series are drawn from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. Data on institutional and political indicators come 
from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI), the Polity IV Database, and 
the International Country Risk Guide. The crisis dummy—taking the value of 1 when a 
country experiences a systemic banking, currency, and debt crisis—is constructed according 
to the list compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2008), and expanded by recent episodes 
outlined by Baldacci et al. (2011). The binary variable for IMF-supported stabilization 
programs is based on lending arrangements,
22 while the binary variable for fiscal rules is 
drawn from the IMF’s Fiscal Rules Dataset.
23 
 
  
                                                 
22 The list of IMF lending arrangements, which are similar to a line of credit and require a country to observe 
specific terms in order to be eligible to receive a disbursement or to maintain a flexible or precautionary line of 
credit, is available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr1.aspx. 
23 Schaechter et al. (2012) provide detailed information on the Fiscal Rules Dataset, which is available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm.   32 
 
 
Table 1. Country Sample 
 
 
  
Advanced Developing
24 25
Australia Argentina
Austria Bolivia
Belgium Brazil
Canada Chile
Denmark China
Finland Colombia
France Costa Rica
Germany Dominican Republic
Greece Ghana
Iceland Honduras
Ireland Hungary
Israel India
Italy Indonesia
Japan Mexico
South Korea Pakistan
Netherlands Panama              
New Zealand Paraguay
Norway Peru
Portugal Philippines
Spain Poland
Sweden South Africa
Switzerland Thailand
United Kingdom Turkey
United States Uruguay
Venezuela
Notes:
1/  Country classification is based on per capita income level, export 
diversification, and degree of integration into the global financial system, 
according to the IMF's WEO database. 33 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptions of Variables and Data Sources 
 
 
  
Variable Description Source
Cyclically adjusted primary budget balance
Budget balance net of interest payments and stripping out the effect of the business cycle in 
percent of potential GDP IMF/FAD
Gross government debt Stock of gross general government debt in percent of GDP WEO
Real GDP per capita Ratio of real GDP to total population (log) WEO
Output gap Deviation of real GDP from its trend in percent of GDP IMF
Inflation Annual percentage change in the consumer price index WEO
Short-term interest rate Percent WEO
Long-term bond yield Percent WEO
Real exchange rate Real effective exchange rate index (2005 = 100) WDI
Domestic credit Domestic bank lending in percent of GDP (log) WEO
Market capitalization Stock market valuation in percent of GDP WDI
Property prices Average residential real estate prices (log) BIS
Natural resource rents in percent of GDP WDI
Trade openness Ratio of exports amd imports to GDP (percent) WEO
Change in terms of trade Annual percentage change in the terms of trade index WEO
Population Total population in millions (log) WEO
Political regime Type of political regime ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) Polity IV
Government fragmentation
The probability that two deputies picked random from among the government parties will be of 
different parties DPI
Bureaucratic quality Index ICRG
Corruption
Index of corruption perception measuring excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservation, secret 
party funding, and close ties between politics and business ICRG
Old-age dependency ratio Number of people aged 65 or over in percent of working-age population (aged 15-64) WDI
IMF-supported program
Binary variable (taking the value of one when a country implements an IMF-supported program 
in a given year) IMF
Crisis
Binary variable (taking the value of one when a country experiences an episode of banking, 
currency and/or debt crisis) IMF
Election Binary variable (taking the value of one in an election year) DPI
Fiscal rule Binary variable (taking the value of one when there is a numerical fiscal rule in effect) IMF/FAD 34 
 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Table 4. Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std-dev Min Max
Cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 1174 1.45 3.68 -26.02 21.44
Gross government debt 1176 57.00 31.00 4.10 235.71
Output gap 1176 -0.07 3.24 -19.08 14.26
Real GDP per capita (log) 1127 8.84 1.34 5.40 10.64
Inflation 1127 25.00 265.25 -1.71 7481.70
Short-term interest rate 1127 26.93 312.73 0.00 9394.29
Long-term bond yield 902 8.80 8.14 0.80 96.88
Real exchange rate 1127 102.93 18.55 37.51 227.20
Domestic credit (log) 1127 4.31 0.70 2.35 5.85
Market capitalization 1073 52.94 49.05 0.17 309.45
Property prices (log) 568 5.06 1.18 3.23 9.70
Natural resource rents 1127 3.35 5.78 0.00 47.88
Trade openness 1127 69.33 34.84 13.75 198.77
Terms of trade 1176 104.2 34.7 28.9 678.8
Population (log) 1176 3.14 1.50 0.23 7.21
Regime type 1127 7.85 3.79 -7.00 10.00
Government fragmentation 1127 0.27 0.28 0.00 0.89
Bureaucratic quality 1127 2.95 1.01 0.00 4.00
Corruption 1127 3.62 1.42 0.00 6.00
Old-age dependency ratio 1127 15.78 7.53 5.35 38.03
Source: Authors' calculations.
Variable
3/
IPS ADF - Fisher
2/ PP - Fisher
2/
IPS ADF - Fisher
2/ PP - Fisher
2/
Cyclically adjusted primary budget balance -4.18*** 164.18*** 110.66 -18.21*** 463.58*** 658.58***
Gross government debt -1.96 140.14*** 73.91 -9.64*** 287.45*** 305.27***
Real GDP per capita  6.30 65.44 51.06 -10.02*** 274.35*** 313.85***
Output gap -2.41*** 246.28*** 122.19** -14.74*** 372.39*** 451.78***
Consumer price index  3.49 128.02 91.82 -7.54*** 247.82*** 254.90***
Short-term int. rate -29.13*** 729.58*** 1003.25*** -69.40*** 982.19*** 1921.26***
Long-term bond yield -2.93*** 134.17*** 168.68*** -19.99*** 438.64*** 712.40***
Real exchange rate -2.84** 144.17** 111.67 -14.67*** 370.98*** 500.72***
Domestic credit  -1.83 115.24 88.14 -16.84*** 429.06*** 623.75***
Broad money supply  0.55 93.30 53.61 -12.60*** 344.17*** 452.70***
Market capitalization -5.97*** 167.57*** 148.31*** -20.56*** 517.97*** 1645.05***
Property prices 0.70 49.50 55.35 -2.91*** 91.88*** 59.52
Natural Resource Rents -5.92*** 191.10*** 175.69*** -20.33*** 508.47*** 1331.37***
Trade openness -3.32*** 140.25** 110.85 -18.92*** 479.47*** 660.92***
Terms of Trade -4.88*** 197.32*** 178.89*** -22.48*** 582.08*** 1364.62***
Population  2.99 149.07* 91.73 -2.42** 235.77*** 252.65***
Notes:
4/ All economic and financial variables are stationary when differenced except property prices. Non stationary variables are in bold. Rejection of the PP - Fisher panel unit root 
test in differences is likely due to missing values.
3/ The null hypothesis is that of a unit root process - Ho: all of the time series in the panel are nonstationary; i.e., rejection of the null means that the variables are stationary . 
The symbols * and ** denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
1/ Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test (IPS) and Fisher tests for unbalanced panels allow for heterogeneous coefficients. All pooled unit root tests include individual intercept and 
individual linear trend. Four lag length selection based on Schwarz Info Criterion
Panel tests for unit root in  differences
 1/  Panel tests for unit root in levels
1/
2/ Probabilities for Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests are computed with an asymptotic Chi -square distribution. IPS test assumes asymptotic normality. 35 
 
Table 5. System GMM Dynamic Panel by Period—All Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2
Cyclically adjusted primary balance (t-1)  0.657*** 0.573*** 0.721*** 0.436*** 0.865*** 0.866***
[0.139] [0.139] [0.070] [0.099] [0.050] [0.059]
Gross government debt (t-1) 0.006 0.021 0.014*** -0.004 -0.001 0.039
[0.006] [0.018] [0.004] [0.018] [0.002] [0.026]
Output gap (t-1) -0.012 0.038 -0.100*** -0.121* -0.300*** -0.183**
[0.040] [0.058] [0.035] [0.061] [0.069] [0.089]
Real GDP per capita (log) 0.478*** 0.910*** -0.078
[0.177] [0.253] [0.264]
Short-term interest rate 0.001** 0.019 0.057
[0.000] [0.013] [0.064]
Real exchange rate -0.014** -0.030*** 0.007
[0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
Domestic credit (log) -0.798** -0.752* -0.879
[0.373] [0.381] [0.566]
Stock market capitalization 0.012*** 0.005 0.012
[0.004] [0.004] [0.007]
Old-age dependency ratio -0.038 -0.082 -0.009
[0.040] [0.063] [0.067]
Government fragmentation*Corruption -0.017 0.410* 0.232
[0.104] [0.198] [0.178]
Number of observations 488 452 392 384 245 237
Number of countries 49 48 49 48 49 48
Specification tests (p-values) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.117 0.112
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.526 0.647 0.929 0.876 0.479 0.448
Hansen-Sargent test 0.430 0.847 0.426 0.730 0.118 0.133
Source: Authors' estimations.
1/ The table reports one-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ package in Stata. The one-step estimation uses three lags 
with robust standard errors in brackets, consistent to panel specific heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The two-step estimation uses collapsed instrument 
matrix, two lags and finite sample corrected standard errors in brackets. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests report the p-values for the first and second order residual 
autocorrelation in the first differenced equation, providing no evidence for significant second order autocorrelation.Hansen-Sargent test for overindentifying 
restrictions provides the probability value for H0 joint validity of the instruments. Higher probability value suggests that the instruments are exogenous and not 
correlated with the error term. The test is robust but grows weaker with higher number of moment conditions. 
2/ All results in the table are presented in easily comparable format. Regressions 1 and 2  have exactly the same specification throughout all periods.     
3/ Regressions include the following control variables -  natural resource rents, old age dependency ratio and IMF-supported program, which were found to be 
insignificant.
4/ *, **, *** indicates significance at 10 percent (p<0.10), 5 percent (p<0.05) and 1 percent (p<0.01), respectively.
Sample Specifications 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2007 2008 - 2012
Notes :  36 
 
 
Table 6. Residual-based Volatility—All Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
two-step GMM 
estimation
12 3 4
SD of residuals of cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (t-1)  0.310*** 0.281*** 0.284*** 0.066***
[0.068] [0.077] [0.067] [0.113]
Gross government debt (t-1) 0.026*** 0.027** 0.028** 0.021
[0.018] [0.010] [0.012] [0.016]
Output gap (t-1) 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.001
[0.029] [0.030] [0.031] [0.040]
SD of real GDP growth  0.051* 0.079**
[0.030] [0.029]
SD of real exchange rate 0.021** 0.013 0.014**
[0.009] [0.008] [0.007]
Natural resource rents 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.013
[0.004] [0.016] [0.019]
Bureaucratic quality -0.181
[0.132]
Fiscal rule -0.264
[0.189]
Number of observations/countries 1022/48 1022/48 1022/48 1022/48
Number of instruments 129 130 128 11
Specification tests (p-values) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.008 0.010 0.014 0.001
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.492 0.455 0.441 0.811
Source: Authors' estimations.
3/ Regressions include the following control variables - real GDP per capita, standard deviation of cpi, trade openness,domestic 
credit, standard deviation of stock market cap., government fragmentation, corruption, and crisis, which were found to be insignificant.   
4/ *, **, *** indicates significance at 10% (P<0.10), 5% (P<0.05) and 1% (P<0.01) respectively.
Dependent variable: Standard Deviation (SD) of the residuals from country-specific regressions.
1/
one-step GMM estimation
Notes : 
1/ The table reports one and two -step System GMM dynamic panel estimations carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ package in Stata 
(Roodman, 2009). Following Fatás and Mihov (2003), we measure volatility using the standard deviation of the residuals from  
estimated fiscal reaction function of the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance on its lagged value, lagged government debt, and lagged 
output gap. 
2/ All results in the table are presented in easily comparable format. Regression 1 (one-step GMM) have exactly the same 
specification as regression 4 (two-steps GMM).                  37 
 
 
Source: International  Monetary Fund; Authors' calculations.
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Figure 1. Budget Balance and Government Debt, 1990-2012 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Fiscal Policy Volatility, 1990–2012 
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Figure 3. Overall Budget and Gross Debt Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4. Cyclically adjusted budget balance vs. Gross Debt 
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Figure 5. Cyclically adjusted budget balance vs. Output Gap 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Cyclically adjusted budget balance vs. GDP per capita  
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